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 Understanding Political Islam in Algeria 
Experiences, Past and Present 
 
LOTFI SOUR 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 As a Muslim-majority country and a regional power with ambitions 
occupying a highly strategic peculiar position, Algeria is pivotal to U.S and 
Western security interests in a critical and unstable zone where the North Africa, 
the African Sahel, and the Middle East intersect. Henceforth, Algeria’s 
importance derives not only from its geopolitical position, and as major 
producer of oil and gas but also from the example that it provides of its 
experience in fighting terrorism which has become a model that inspires many 
the world over. 
 The first component of the shape of modern Algeria, its ties to Islam, 
first developed during the 7th century, when Arabs conquered Algeria with little 
resistance from the local population. Then, the various resistance movements 
against the French Colonization gained justification not only in the name of 
Algeria but also of Islam, and since independence Islamist movements have 
made up the major opposition to successive Algerian regimes. Islamism1 as 
some would name it, is a very sensitive issue not only on the Algerian or Arabic 
scene, but at the international level too. Beyond the empirical investigation, 
political Islam, although a more modern concept, arising out of and from a post-
colonial era, treads a different path, as opposed to what most Western political 
pundits and analysts conventionally think. However, the Islamist movement in 
Algeria is far from homogenous, pluralistic by nature. Algeria has a wide range 
of Islamist tendencies, illustrated by Islamist parties’ different strategies towards 
the state, civil society and external partners. The aim of this paper is to 
deconstruct the political Islam phenomenon dynamics in Algeria, this 
framework will allow for a better understanding of the current islamization 
process. In addition to that, the paper purpose to comprehend and elucidate the 
key characteristic features of political Islam movements in Algeria.  
                                                 
1
  The term “Islamism” or “political Islam” designates a complex phenomenon with 
multiple dimensions and various ramifications, in its contemporary shape, it is an 
“ideology”, a “movement-organization” and a “form of government”.  
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 The first part of the article bears an introductory character focusing on 
historical background of the Islamism in Algeria. The second part explores the 
history of political Islam in Algerian post colonial context, including critical 
analysis of National Vision Movements. Following that the latter and larger part 
of the study examines the dominant role Islamism played in Algerian political 
life following the regime's decision to allow greater political pluralism from 
1989, in particular, the emergence and development period of the main Islamist 
political party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) which is considered and 
analyzed along with the dynamics determine its agenda and strategy, also, 
Eventually, within the scope of this part explores the Islamists descent into 
increasingly bloody armed struggle with the regime. 
   
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN 
ALGERIA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In Algeria, Islamism is a phenomenon that was from the beginning 
influenced by various external intellectual and religious-educational currents. In 
fact, such influence goes back to World War I (1914-1918) when the youth who 
refused to be drafted into the French Army emigrated eastwards and attended 
Tunisian and Middle Eastern universities (al-Zeitouna in Tunisia, al Azhar in 
Egypt and other religious institutions in the Levant and the Arab Peninsula)2. 
These self-exiled students returned after the Great War influenced by the neo-
reformism of Mohammed Abduh and Jamal-Din Al-Afghani. It was these 
students who established the Association of Algerian Ulama and planted the 
first seeds of Islamism in Algeria. 
Thus, the importance of Islam in the struggle against the French was 
almost inevitable, it being difficult to conceive of any other framework in which 
resistance to the Christian invader could be so effectively mobilized. Going 
back further, Algerian historiography records a genuine nationalist figure 
around whose image all Algerians could unite. This is Abd al-Qadir, who 
fought battles across Algeria against French forces seeking to pacify the 
country. Abd al-Qadir's specific use of the term Amir derived from the fuller 
title Amir al-Muminin (Commander of the Believers), was indicative of the 
Islamic context in which he both clothed and conducted his struggle. He used it 
in preference to other less religious titles he could have assumed, his use also of 
the term jihad to characterize his campaign against the French was clearly much 
more than the expedient rallying cry of previous conflicts3. 
                                                 
2
  Mustapha Al-Ahnaf et al, L'Algerie par ses Islamistes, Karthala, Paris, 1991, p. 22. 
3
  Raphael Danziger, Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance and Internal 
Consolidation, Holmes & Meier, New York and London, 1977, pp. 51-63. 
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 The Islam that they expressed and sought to defend in the face of the 
French imperial onslaught was very much the popular Islam that had come to 
dominate and characterise Algeria over the centuries. Abd al-Qadir had 
emerged from the traditional rural strongholds of the sufi brotherhoods and 
marabouts in the west of the country. The messianism and millenialism of the 
various mandist revolts reflected the even more mystic trends present in the 
remote and peripheral mountain and semi-desert area in which they 
predominantly occurred. However, it was not these traditional elements that 
became the true forefathers and founders of Algeria's Islamist movement, it was 
developments in twentieth century Algeria that produced new elements in 
Algerian Islam that provided the real starting point in the history and 
development of Algerian Islamism. 
Therefore, the Islamic movement reflects not only the social and cultural 
fabric of society but also the very dynamics that shape change and lead to either 
stability or instability. The development of this movement is also affected by 
the socio-economic conditions of the country, the type of political system and 
its political culture and also the different cultural and intellectual currents that 
wade through society. However, it was the interaction with the east that created 
such doctrinal inclinations and this was due two essential causes: the lack of a 
strong indigenous scholarly tradition in Algeria, and the non-existence of 
reputable Islamic institutions (like al-Azhar in Egypt or al-Zaitouna in Tunisia, 
for example). Both reasons have created a vacuum that can only be filled by 
external inputs4. 
 According to John Entelis, “the growth of Islamic revivalism and 
reformism in Algeria as part of the broader awakening of Arab-Muslim 
consciousness that was taking place among the peoples of the Middle East and 
North Africa during the inter-war period”. The 1920s, the decade which 
witnessed the first real growth and spread of reformist ideas in Algeria, was also 
the period which saw the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-
Banna in Egypt5. 
 Furthermore, religion and politics in Algeria are influenced by the 
country’s ethnic and demographic situation. Unlike the secular Arab nationalism 
of the Baath, Algerian nationalism was explicitly Muslim. And, unlike the 
narrowly elitist Free Officers' movement which seized power in Egypt in 1952, 
the FLN (National Liberation Front) emanated from a popular nationalist 
movement and mobilized nearly all tendencies, including the Islamic one. In 
Algerian anti-colonialism; the conflict between Nasser's regime and the Muslim 
                                                 
4
  Graham E. Fuller, Algeria the Next Fundamentalist State?, Arroyo Center & RAND, 
United States, 1996, pp. 37-38. 
5
  John Entelis, Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized, Westview, Boulder, 1986, p. 42.  
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Brotherhood had no equivalent in Algeria6. The Islamic reform movement (al-
Islah) in late colonial Algeria, although an extension of the Salafiyya movement 
from which the Muslim Brothers sprang7, did not evolve into a rival to the FLN, 
led from 1931 onwards by Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben Badis's Association of 
Algerian Muslim Ulama (AUMA)8. 
 In its founding articles the Association described itself as “an 
association for moral education” and gave as one of its primary aims the fight 
against the “social scourges” of “alcoholism, gambling, idleness, ignorance”. It 
also declared its intention “to open centers, circles and elementary schools”9. 
The AUMA have traditionally sought educational reforms in an attempt to 
incorporate Islamic education into the lives of the population10. Some reforms 
have been accomplished at various times in Algeria through the efforts of 
AUMA, and in the mid-1960s by Malek Bennabi11. The reformist movement 
that achieved eventual institutional expression through the Association of 
Algerian Ulama was distinct from those of Abd al-Qadir, Bou Ma’za and the 
various Madhist movements that had risen against the French in the mid 
nineteenth century. It grounded itself theologically in scripturalist 
interpretations of Islam, rather than ones based on entrenched local traditions 
and mysticism and drew its inspiration from foreign thinkers and movements. It 
also emerged in and appealed to a different section of Algerian society. 
Reformist Islam's open hostility to the manifestations of these more traditional 
expressions of Islam further underlined these differences. 
 The FLN (National Liberation Front) established its monopoly of the 
representation of Algerian Muslims between 1954 and 1962 by co-opting the 
main pre-existing movements, and it bequeathed a highly developed capacity 
for co-optation to the independent state12. 
                                                 
6
  Ahmed Tahan, Harakat Al-Islamiyah Bain al-Fitna wal Jihad, transl. as Islamic 
Movements between Division and Jihad, Dar Marefah Press, Lebanon, 2007, pp. 265-268. 
7
  International crisis group, Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page, 
ICG Middle East Report, No. 29, Cairo/Brussels, 30 July 2004, in 
https://www.google.dz/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8
&ved=0ahUKEwjl5eSJ_4jKAhUFzxQKHURIBJ, accessed on November 15, 2015. 
8
  Ali Merad, Le Reformisme Musulman en Algerie de 1925 a 1940, Moulton & Co., Paris, 
1967, p. 79. 
9
  Claude Collot, Jean-Robert Henry, Le Mouvement National Algerien: Textes 1912-1954, 
L'Harmattan, Paris, 1978, pp. 44-47. 
10
  Michael WILLIS, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, Lebanon, NY: Ithaca, 1996, p. 11. 
11
  Ibidem, pp. 11-13. 
12
  In 1955-1956, the FLN performed the tour de force of coopting not only the AUMA but 
also Ferhat Abbas's Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (representing the 
Westernised middle classes) and the Algerian Communist Party. The only element it did 
not co-opt were the die-hard supporters of Messali Hadj, whose rival Algerian National 
Movement it eliminated physically. Co-optation has been a prominent tactic of the post-
colonial state and a central aspect of its response to the Islamist movement since 1989. 
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 Organizationally, the AUMA provided significant support to the FLN's 
cause. The continued expansion of the Association's education network ‒ the 
number of schools it administered doubling from 90 in 1947 to 181 by 1954, 
with its madrases (schools) alone providing an education for 40.000 pupils ‒ 
provided important logistical bases for the rebels13. Together with the reformist-
run mosques they also provided useful collection points for funds and centers 
for the spread of information and the nationalist message. Sermons during the 
month of Ramadan, in 1956 in particular, helped to stoke patriotic fervour and 
popular support for the struggle. The eventual victory in 1962 of the Algerian 
nationalists in their war against the French colonial state and the final 
achievement of full political independence clearly opened a whole new chapter 
in both Algerian history and the role of Islam and Islamism in it. However, it 
also closed a chapter: that of the role of Islam in the colonial period. 
 
 
THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM  
IN POST-INDEPENDENCE ALGERIA 
 
 The final achievement of independence in June 1962 shifted the whole 
focus of Algerian activity and attention away from the all-consuming struggle 
against the French and towards the construction and consolidation of their new 
state. Though, fracturing inevitably occurred in the institutional front and 
hegemony that the FLN had been able to forge during the nearly eight years of 
the war of liberation as different ideological, regional, personal and factional 
interests engaged in a struggle for pre-eminence. However, whilst liberals, 
Marxists, internal and external army commanders, the wilaya commanders, the 
imprisoned leaders and Berber-based factions entered the political and 
occasionally armed competition for influence, an independent and identifiable 
lobby arguing for a specifically Islamically-based Algeria was notably absent. 
The Islamic current, so robustly represented by the Association of Algerian 
Ulama in the two decades preceding the war of liberation, had been sidelined 
during the struggle, its absorption by the FLN, in contrast to other groupings 
that joined the front, having deprived it of its independent voice and agenda14. 
 However, in the post-independence period, the heady policies of 
socialism and Third Worldism pursued by the FLN, elicited Islamist resistance 
and at times organized opposition. The most significant group to emerge in the 
1960s was Al Qiyam (values), which called for Algeria's cultural rehabilitation 
                                                 
13
  Charles-Robert Ageron, Histoire de L'Algerie contemporaine, Presses Universitaires de 
France, Paris, 1979, p. 582.  
14
  David Ottaway, Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution, 
University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970, p. 47. 
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to complement its national autonomy. Under the leadership of Hashemi Tidjani, 
Ben Badis's successor, this group successfully lobbied Ahmed Ben Bella to 
mandate Islamic religious education in public schools. Through its social 
networks and journal, Maggallot al-tadhib al-Islamiyya, the association stood 
firm against a rising tide of secularism. The essential blueprint of Islamic 
politics emerged at this point, as insistence on cultural integrity often led to 
political expressions inconsistent with the demands of the state15. This process 
culminated in the unveiling of “A Charter for an Islamic State” at Algiers 
University on November 12, 1982. Demonstrations on university campuses led 
to clashes with police and a number of arrests in the weeks that followed. 
Throughout the period 1979-1982 the Chadli regime had practised a fairly 
tolerant approach to the clearly growing Islamist tendency. The reasons for such 
an approach were probably linked to the presence of Islamist sympathies 
amongst some of the senior personnel in the government but more likely were 
the result of wider policy considerations and needs on the part of the regime16. 
 
 
ISLAMISM IN MODERN ALGERIA: 
POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN AGENDA 
 
 In the context of an assessment of the ability to integrate, the Islamic 
movements in the political process and encourage them to embrace moderation 
in order to allow them play a role in the process of democratization, Algeria 
witnessed the emergence of three key Islamic movements that compete for 
prominence among the masses: the movement of the “Algerian Muslim 
Brotherhood” the so called association “Movement Djaz'ara” or “cultural 
building movement” and the “Salafi movement” The first was launched after 
the Egyptian experience and the transfer of political thought of the Muslim 
Brotherhood from Egypt to Algeria17. The second came from the experience and 
the role of the historic Association of Muslim Scholars in the Algerian 
revolution and after independence transformed to a so called “Djaz'ara” 
movement which stemmed from the university students, influenced by the 
Islamic thinker, “Malik Ibn Naby”. The third the “Salafi Movement” was 
inspired by the mass of the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia18. 
We can deconstruct external influence on Algerian Islamism by classifying this 
                                                 
15
  Michael Willis, The Islamists Challenge in Algeria: A Political History, New York, 1996, 
pp. 1-69. 
16
  Hugh Roberts, “Radical Islamism and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: The 
Embattled Arians of Algiers”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 2, April 1988, p. 577. 
17
  Amel Boubekeur, “Political Islam in Algeria”, CEPS Working Document, No. 268, May 
2007, pp. 4-6. 
18
  Idem, “Salafism and Radical Politics in Post conflict Algeria”, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie 
Middle East Center, Number 11, September 2008, pp. 4-5. 
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influence into three typologies. The first category is intellectual in essence. Several 
Algerian Islamists have been influenced by the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood 
of Egypt and Syria. This is particularly true for some Algerian students who studies 
in both states, or those taught by Egyptian or Syrian teachers working in Algeria up 
to the late 1980s. An analysis of three Islamist parties belonging to this intellectual 
and political breed in Algeria (HMS, An_nahda and al-Islah) reveals the extent of 
this influence19, as do the organic links that tie the HMS party to the International 
Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The second category could be termed “spiritual influence”. A large fraction 
of the Algerian youth has been deeply influenced by the Salafi doctrine. This 
influence was also noticeable in the eighties when the Chadli regime lifted age 
restrictions on people going for Umrah or Hajj. Quite a number of pilgrims (and 
many students studying in the Arabian Peninsula) returned to Algeria enriched 
by this spiritual experience and deeply touched by the intensity of religious 
discourse in the Holy land of Islam20. They came back spreading their newly 
acquired doctrinal convictions and ideas. They further strengthened Salafi 
presence in Algeria. Ali Belhadj is perceived in Algeria as one of the prominent 
figures of this Salafist movement and the late Jordanian scholar al_Albani as its 
spiritual guide21. 
The final category could be termed methodical influence. More than 1400 
Algerians served in the Afghan war22 and returned back indoctrinated with the 
kind of thinking that led them to refuse anything but their own concept of the 
Khilafat and Islamic state. They perceived the existing political system as a 
legitimate target for their conception of Jihad. These afghan veterans constituted 
the hard core of terrorist groups in the country which subscribe to an 
internationalist agenda (from the GSPC to the AQMI). In fact, a careful and 
comparative reading of the discourses and methodologies adopted by these 
groups with book written by one of the leaders of the International Jihadi 
Movement Omar Abdelhakim alias Abu Mussab23 demonstrates the striking 
resemblance between them24.  
 Nevertheless, by using a historical perspective, Islamist groups fall into 
three broad categories, which are listed below, depending on the strategy for 
islamization adopted by each category: 
 1. Religious-political movements: These are composed of Islamic Welfare 
and religious groups, associations and individuals that reject the state's monopoly 
                                                 
19
  Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria 1988–2002, Verso, London, 2003, p. 65. 
20
  Martin Evans, John Phillips, Algeria. Anger of the Dispossessed, Yale University Press, 
New Haven and London, 2007, pp. 144-145.  
21
  Amel Boubekeur, “Salafism and Radical Politics…cit.”, p. 17.  
22
  Camille Tawil, Brothers in Arms: The Story of Al-Qa'ida and the Arab Jihadists, Saqi, 
London, 2010, p. 70.  
23
  Abu Musab al-Suri’s, A Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria, 1988-
1996. Al-Suri is considered to be the Clausewitz of al-Qaida, despite his capture in 2005. 
24
  Ibidem, pp. 86-73.  
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on Islamic discourse and strive to recapture the initiative in this area from the 
authorities by promoting charitable, cultural, educational and social activities. This 
is how all the politically-oriented Islamic movements started in the sixties and the 
seventies. The associations, groups and individuals that belong to this category want 
to re-islamize society through education, welfare and the spread of the moral code. 
In the case of Algeria, one can mention the association of al-Qiyam (values) in the 
sixties or al-Irshad wal islah (an association belonging to the HMS party) and the 
former Islamic League (al-rabita al-Islamiya) presided over by the late Sheikh 
Sahnoun, which served as an umbrella organization for all the currents of the 
Islamic movement between 1988 and 199125. 
 2. Politico-Religious movements: This category is composed mainly of 
political parties (HMS, Nahda, al-Islah) that base their strategy on political 
participation in national politics through socialization, mobilization of the 
masses and by taking part in electoral contests. These parties and organizations 
subscribe to Algerian constitutional and organic rules of engagement listed in 
the 1996 Constitution and the 1997 Law on Political Parties. Moreover, the HMS 
has been in government for over 8 years as part of a broad political alliance26. 
 3. Radical Islamist Movements: This category is composed of a nebula 
of militant and hardline groups seeking the immediate transformation of both 
state and society through a terrorist modus operandi. These include the Armed 
Islamic Movement or MIA, the Armed Islamic Groups or GIA, the Islamic 
Salvation Army or AIS which was the armed wing of the disbanded FIS, the 
GSPC and of late al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb which subscribes to the 
global terrorist network's agenda and ideas27. 
 
Table 1 
Typology of Islamist Movements in Algeria 
 
 
STRATEGY 
 
 
Non Violent 
 
Violent 
CATEGORY  
Apolitical Islamists 
Political 
Islamists 
 
Revolutionary Islamists 
AUDIENCE National National Transnational 
 
 
  
 The year 1988 proved to be a watershed in Algeria's modern history. 
Declining oil prices and the emergence of a global surge toward free markets 
led the regime to launch liberalization and deregulation program that entailed 
                                                 
25
  Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998, Hurst & Co., London, 1998, p. 21.  
26
  Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield…cit., p. 100.  
27
  Martin Evans, John Phillips, Algeria…cit., pp. 120-121.  
Understanding Political Islam in Algeria 129 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVI  no. 1  2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the elimination of many social-welfare services and subsidies28. The removal of 
state controls at a time of financial shortfall disproportionately affected the 
urban working class and the poor. The socially disruptive ramifications of this 
policy were exacerbated by high inflation and the emergence of an underground 
economy. The gap between rich and poor continued to grow while official 
corruption, an endemic feature of Algerian bureaucracy, reached alarming rates. 
The much-eroded social compact between the revolutionary regime and the 
populace ruptured with the October 1988 riots throughout Algeria's urban 
centers. The brutal suppression of the marches by the military further 
undermined the legitimacy of a regime that based its power on its historical role 
as a force for liberation. In the aftermath of the riots, that pillar finally began to 
crumble29. The Chadli regime's response to the enveloping economic and 
political crisis was the introduction of sweeping political liberalization. Given 
the failure of its economic policies, the regime perceived that electoral triumphs 
would resurrect its sagging fortunes and once more buff up its tarnished image. 
The aging military men still immured in their revolutionary vision where the 
army was the great liberator and therefore the legitimate repository of power, 
failed to note the arrival of a new generation focused on practical achievements. 
As discussed above, the political liberalization measures came at a time when 
mass discontent with the ruling elite reached a fever pitch and was awaiting an 
avenue for its expression30. Despite the looming problems, the liberalization 
policy initially appeared to yield considerable advantage. For the first time in its 
history, Algeria witnessed a relatively free political atmosphere with a 
flourishing press, competitive political parties and intense debate on the 
direction of the state. Hovering over this renaissance was the ominous shadow 
of persistent economic decline and a restive military hierarchy uneasy about 
departures from the status quo. Algeria's liberal interregnum was bound to be 
short-lived, as the forces of radicalism would soon be plotting to reclaim the 
political landscape31.  
 
 
                                                 
28
  Hugh Roberts, “Algeria’s National Protesta”, Foreign policy, January 10, 2011, in 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/10/algerias-national-protesta, accessed 18 December 
2015. 
29
  Lynette Rummel, “Privatization and Democratization in Algeria, State and Society in 
Algeria”, in John Entelis, Philip Naylor, State and Society in Algeria, Westview, Boulder, 
CO:, 1995, pp. 50-63. 
30
  Lahoari Addi, L'Algerie et la democratie: Pouvoir et crise politique dans l'Algerie 
contemporaine, Paris, 1994; and Algeria's Army, Algeria's Agony, Foreign Affairs, July-
August 1998, in https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/algeria/1998-07-01/algerias-
army-algerias-agony, accessed 11 March 2015. 
31
  William Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from 
Authoritarianism, Brookings, Washington DC:, 1998, pp. 42-62. 
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The Birth of The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)  
 
 The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was founded in March 1989 and 
legalized as a political party the following September. It quickly gained support, 
especially among the urban poor and urban youth, and on 12 June 1990 it won a 
sweeping victory in elections for the communal and regional assemblies ‒ the 
first pluralist elections in independent Algeria32. The FIS employed a broad 
variety of techniques to strengthen its movement, building toward its 
parliamentary election plurality (subsequently annulled) in 1991. These 
techniques include education, the use of money, propagation of a clear-cut 
message, modern media techniques, electioneering, use of municipal power 
bases and the ability to dispense largesse, and broad networks of sympathizers 
that reach into the ruling FLN itself. In most senses, these techniques are 
thoroughly modern, typical of successful emerging political parties in 
developing countries. Social mobilization, rather than underground 
organization, has characterized most of the FIS success at least until the harsh 
state crackdown that has pushed the party into more clandestine forms of 
organization and activity33. Despite a crackdown in June-July 1991, in which its 
leaders, Abassi Madani34 and Ali Ben Hadj35, and many other activists were 
arrested, the party gained a spectacular lead in the first round of the legislative 
elections held on 26 December 1991, which placed it on course for a massive 
majority in the National Assembly if the second round went ahead on 16 
January 199236. Instead, on 11 January 1992, the army commanders forced 
President Chadli to resign and cancelled the elections37. In the following days, 
they invented a so called High State Committee to serve as a collective 
presidency for the rest of Chadli's term and enforced a previously neglected law 
                                                 
32
  The FIS polled 4.2 million votes (54 per cent of the total) and won control of 854 of 
Algeria's 1.581 communal assemblies and 31 of the 48 wilaya (regional) assemblies. 
33
  Graham E. Fuller, Algeria…cit., pp. 29-30.  
34
  Born in 1931, Abassi took part in the FLN's uprising on 1 November 1954; after 1962 he 
was an FLN militant until the late 1970s and emerged as a leader of the Islamist 
movement in the early 1980s. In Hmida Laayachi's view, “Abassi Madani was more a 
product of the FLN than an Islamist”. ICG interview, 20 August 2003. 
35
  Born in Tunisia into a family of war refugees, Ben Hadj emerged during the 1988 riots as 
the leading Islamist in the Bab El Oued district of Algiers. 
36
  The FIS polled 3.26 million votes (1 million less than in 1990), only 24.59 per cent of the 
electorate. On a low turnout this amounted to 47.27 per cent of the total vote and enabled 
the FIS to win 188 seats outright and its candidates to gain the lead in 143 of the 198 
undecided seats. Hocine Aït Ahmed's FFS won 25 seats, mainly in Kabylia, the FLN a 
mere sixteen nationwide and Independents three. These results pointed to the FIS 
ultimately gaining around 75 per cent of the seats in the new assembly. 
37  James D. Le Sueur, Algeria since 1989: Between Terror and Democracy, Zed Books, 
New York and London, 2010, pp. 50-54. 
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banning the use of mosques by political parties, thereby provoking violent 
clashes with FIS activists across the country38. 
 These disorders were then invoked to justify the decisions announced 
on 9 February 1992 to introduce a state of emergency and ban the FIS, both of 
which remain in force39. The events of January to March 1992 finally brought to 
a close Algerian Islamism's brief three-year foray into the arena of party 
political competition for political power. The cancellation and annulment of the 
elections by the “new” regime formally signaled an end to Algeria's wider and 
similarly short-lived experiment with democratization and political pluralism. 
As Luis Martinez indicated, the dramatic political transformation that occurred 
at the heart of the Algerian political system at the start of 1992 ensured that 
revolutionary politics became routine politics for most of the players involved 
in this struggle for state power40. The period 1992 to 1994 witnessed the 
Islamist movement entering what could be described as its “post-
constitutionalist” period. This transition was not chosen of its own volition, 
however much some Islamists may have welcomed it, but was rather imposed 
on it by the regime through the cancellation of the elections and the dissolution 
of the FIS. 
 The effective exclusion of the FIS from Algeria's constitutional and 
electoral processes, with explicit assurances from the regime that it, or any 
similar successor party, would not be permitted to rejoin these processes at 
some future stage, vindicated those elements in the Islamist movement who had 
either explicitly rejected or otherwise tactically gone along with the electoral 
strategy of the FIS. The cancellation of the elections and the dissolution of the 
FIS were signals to these elements that the movement should resort to the more 
fitting means of acquiring power through armed struggle41. 
 As discussed above, after the FIS was banned, the jihadist Salafism got 
involved in a dark tunnel of violence against the regime. According to scientific 
Salafists, Salafist militants had gone astray when they decided to confront the 
regime and used violence against innocent civilians. They believe that the 
Jihadist Salafist groups lost their pretext to fight against the regime which called 
for truce with other Islamic movements42. 
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 In 1997, the armed organization of the FIS unilaterally declared a cease-
fire; in 1999, after negotiations with Abdelqader Hachani, considered to be the 
“number three” man within the FIS, the groundwork was laid for Bouteflika's 
“civil reconciliation” program, the centerpiece of which was a general amnesty 
for members of the FIS and its armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). 
Bouteflika hoped that this would enable the government to concentrate on 
combating the GIA and another radical militant organization, the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). However, the more militant Islamists have 
refused to abandon the armed struggle, and Hachani himself was assassinated in 
November 1999. Bouteflika has vowed to exterminate armed radicals who did 
not surrender to the state under the terms of the amnesty the GIA and the GSPC 
are estimated to number between 5.000 and 7.000 militants43. Nevertheless, 
while violence still continues in Algeria, the government has had greater success 
since 1999 in containing and localizing the bloodshed. 
 The FIS had an armed military faction ‒ the Islamic Armed Group 
(GIA), but after several years of civil war most elements of the GIA reconciled. 
The irreconcilables among the GIA formed the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC). This group would last from 2002 to 2007, and although still in 
existence, most of the GSPC would reconcile with the government and those 
refusing to compromise formed the bulk of what is Al-Qaida in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM). The FIS today has evolved into an open but illegal political 
party that has joined in opposition to the current government of Algeria44. 
 
 
The Descent into Conflict:  
The Evolution of Militant Islam in Algeria 
 
 Radical Islam is not a novelty in Algeria. The first instance of armed 
insurgency was undertaken by the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA). Radical 
groups emerged in 1993 that challenged the idea, taken up by the MIA and the 
AIS, of returning to the political process and, to that end, of focusing on 
targeting the government. Established in 1991, the Movement for the Islamic 
State (MEI) focused on taking the battle to the people of Algeria45. This group 
constituted the precursor of Islamic radicalism in Algeria. The AIS is the official 
military wing of the FIS. This group has gained notoriety as the best equipped 
armed Islamic group. The AIS was created in 1994 by internal and clandestine 
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leadership of the FIS when they realized that the movement was likely to be 
carried along by the GIA extremists in a “fight to the death”. The AIS attempted 
to distance itself from the GIA by condemning the latter’s terrorist acts, 
although it did not renounce armed conflict. The AIS has however primarily 
targeted the security forces and Special Forces46.  
 The GIA was created in 1993 as a result of the oppression orchestrated 
by the regime, which radicalized the extreme fringes of the Islamic movement, 
which thereafter became disillusioned with any political discourse47. The GIA’s 
strategy in the war is understood as one of “total war”, the destruction of the 
ruling regime by eliminating all bases of social support for it. In contrast to the 
MIA and AIS, the GIA was active for the most part in urban settings, whereas 
the MIA and the AIS were firmly established in and conducted operations from 
mountainous areas. From 1998 on, the GIA and a splinter group from it, the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), as well as other groups 
related to the GSPC have been active48. 
 The FIS established a dual strategy combining conciliation and 
aggressiveness. It attacked the state bureaucracy-its corruption and nepotism 
and the spread of un-Islamic practices, and focused on social welfare through 
acts of national solidarity and large political demonstrations to force the regime 
to consider some Islamic perceptions on matters of national concern49. In 
addition, the FIS reverted to armed violence in January 1992 in response to the 
army’s coup, its annulment of the FIS national election victory, its rejection of 
FIS activists who sought peaceful means to power, the subsequent arrest of 
hundreds of FIS leaders including its top leadership, and the outright banning of 
the party50. These events changed the character of the Algerian political 
struggle. What had been emerging as an uncomfortable accommodation 
between a reformist presidency and the FIS had been transformed into a zero-
sum game that has brought the country into a state of massive violence and 
guerilla war51. In order to avoid the “Illumination of Algerian politics” by the 
FIS after its victory in the general elections, and in order to secure their own 
interests and that of the nomenklatura, the army cancelled these elections and 
adopted a multidimensional strategy for the uprooting of the FIS as a political 
and social force. The strategy was not considered as one of containment, but 
final eradication of the FIS52. 
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 Meanwhile, the wider Islamist movement in Algeria became more 
moderate, accepting the electoral process and even allowing women’s 
participation in it as well as in the economy at large53. Unlike the FIS, those 
Algerian Islamist parties with participationist strategies toward the state, like the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas (Movement of Society for Peace), and Islah 
(National Reform Movement) have been allowed to compete politically, and 
since 1997, Hamas has even been part of the Presidential Alliance, comprising 
the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the National Democratic Rally (RND). 
 On the other hand, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika offered an amnesty 
to Islamist rebels in September 1999. Most groups accepted, and by the January 
2000 deadline some 5.000 AIS militants had surrendered their weapons54. But 
the GSPC refused amnesty. By 2002 the GSPC claimed to have over 4.000 
fighters and was concentrating its attacks on Algerian military convoys and 
bases. In September 2002 Bouteflika ordered a crackdown on the GSPC, 
Algeria’s largest anti-Islamist operation in five years55. The Group responded 
with stepped-up raids, including an attack led by Saïfi on a convoy near Batna 
in January 2003 that killed forty-three soldiers56. Despite the GSPC’s new 
global rhetoric, Hattab remained committed to national jihad, but his leadership 
was challenged by rival amirs who had a more internationalist outlook, 
including Nabil Sahraoui, Abdelmalek Droukdel (a.k.a. Abu Musab 
Abdelwadoud), and Saïfi. Saïfi’s kidnapping of thirty-two European tourists in 
the Tassili Massif was a challenge to Hattab57. 
 
 
Algerian Islamism in Crossroad:  
From Domestic “Jihad” Toward Transnational Terror 
 
 Basically, there had always been a certain degree of tension 
between national jihad and global jihad in the Algerian Islamist 
movement. The “Afghans” were inspired by global jihad because of their 
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experience in Pakistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But the GIA’s 
self-proclaimed goal had always been “jihad in Algeria”. Jean-Pierre Filiu 
addresses this issue, saying “the national framework of the armed struggle was 
explicit”58. This same tension between national vs. global jihad continued under 
the GSPC/AQIM. Hassan Hattab, for example, was an Algerianist, focused on 
national jihad. With the death of Antar Zouabri at the hands of security forces in 
February 2002, the GIA falling apart, and the AIS long gone, Hattab preferred to 
retrench and concentrate on the GSPC’s Kabilia strongholds in the mountains 
east of Algiers. However, Hattab’s Algerian strategy was challenged by other 
amirs with a more global outlook, including Sahraoui, Droukdel (a.k.a. Abu 
Musab Abdelwadoud), and Saïfi (a.k.a. Abdelrezak El-Para). Saïfi’s kidnapping 
of the thirty-two hostages in early 2003 can be seen, therefore, as a direct 
challenge to Hattab’s national jihad approach59. Hattab was deposed in 2003 by 
the internationalists in favor of the more globally oriented Sahraoui60. 
 Actually, attacks on foreign targets, including attacks on foreign 
installations beyond Algeria’s borders and on foreign interests within Algeria, 
were also manifestations of the GSPC’s global jihad. One of the first such 
attacks was the raid on the Lemghiti army barracks in Mauritania in June 
200561. 
 By the time that GSPC officially became AQIM, global jihad in Algeria 
had failed. Inroads into the Sahara had been significant, and had raised alarm 
among US policy makers, but they appeared to have more to do with 
kidnappings for ransom and contraband trafficking than with global jihad. 
Initiatives undertaken by the internationalist wing of GSPC/AQIM did not 
succeed in integrating the Algerian Islamist movement into the global jihad. Nor 
did they succeed in slowing the prevailing trend among Algerian Muslims away 
from armed jihad altogether, a trend that had manifested itself in a series of 
publicly supported amnesties and the surrender of thousands of fighters. In 
effect, global jihad in Algeria meant local suicide bombings backed by 
internationalist rhetoric. Despite such rhetoric the Group remained focused on 
its strongholds in Kabylia and on its Saharan support groups62. 
 Nonetheless, the attempt by the GSPC/AQIM to turn global and 
embrace the campaign against the Far Enemy, especially the thrust into the 
Sahelian countries, did succeed in one respect: it got the attention of American 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) warriors and led to a massive securitization 
program in the region. 
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 Needless to say, since 9/11, the United States has considered Algeria an 
important partner in this fight against terrorism. The new presence of AQIM at 
an international level is the direct result granted credibility to Algeria's plight 
and strife. The West became very much interested in Algeria as an expert that 
was acquired against a transnational movement that needs to be dealt through a 
concerted international process and on the basis of a consensual legal definition 
of terrorism given by an international legal instrument that is clear and devoid 
of any religious or cultural stereotypes. 
 The January 2013 attack on the In-Aménas gas facility in eastern 
Algeria demonstrated the ongoing threat to such interests from radical groups63. 
However, the Algerian approach focus on the increased regional cooperation 
which is considered to be vital in combating Islamist groups and criminal gangs 
operating in Algeria and in the wider region. For many years, Algeria push for 
regional cooperation and discreet aid from the West is crucial to help the Sahel 
countries regain control of their territory from al-Qaeda forces and prevent the 
terror group from taking hold in Africa64. 
 It is by all accounts remarkable that over the next decade, Algeria’s 
political Islam movement could evolve in a number of different ways. So, the 
future of Islamism in Algeria is not certain at all; especially after the Arab 
Spring which has offered local terrorist groups (radical Islamism) the 
opportunity of gaining ideological influence and material strength and it has 
allowed al-Qaeda to consider repositioning itself on the African continent. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper offers a proper understanding of the far reaching and 
complex dynamics of change within Islamism. The historical evolution of 
Islamism in Algeria reveals its inability to think of itself as existing in a 
pluralistic system, which it denies through the idea of the Islamic state, the use 
of violence, or the rejection of politics. However, Algerian political Islam 
movements also reveal the need for the international community to rethink the 
place of radical Islamist movements.  
 It was argued in the paper that in the Algerian case, shifting patterns of 
state engagement and repression facilitated a change in the Islamist movement 
from non-violent to violent Islamist strategies. Regardless of the fact that 
tactically, violent Islamist groups suggests a greater need to pursue policies that 
address reasons for a group’s choice of violent strategies rather than the pursuit 
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of military-focused policies alone, which often fail to reduce Islamist violence. 
The sudden end to the political opening immediately resulted in clashes 
between Islamists and the security forces. Additionally, the nature of Islamic 
movement and the types of conflicts that have occurred over the last three 
decades has changed significantly. However, to many international observers, it 
is the political participation of hard-line Islamists like the FIS, and their 
rejection of a democratic and secular state, that led Algeria to the violence of 
recent decades, the change in the attitude of political Islam movement towards 
the Algerian regime was dramatic. A shifting relationship between an Islamist 
movement and the state can trigger a violent strategy. Finally, Islamist groups 
are not incorporated into domestic political processes but instead are forcibly 
repressed by the state; they may become transnational organizations, which are 
extremely difficult to control, because transnational groups do not respond well 
to domestic policies, they are less likely to change in response to political 
incentives. This has been the case with Algerian Islamists movements; however 
de-radicalization process and efforts to counter radicalization and violent 
extremism that lead to terrorism must also have global application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
